Quantum-proof decentralized messaging. Wallet + ENS identity. Auth via honesty. One name, no phone number.
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Repository files (latest commit first)
Filename Latest commit message Latest commit date
2026-11-06 05:30:44 -05:00
.github/workflows ci: migrate workflows off Blacksmith runners 2026-11-06 05:30:44 -05:00
.wrangler/cache feat: sovereign fleet updates and launch sync 2026-08-17 14:32:34 +02:00
assets docs: add hero image + OG/social-preview asset 2026-08-17 09:03:19 +02:00
etherhive-auth feat: wire wallet+ENS shared login into the real ircd (ULTRAPLAN phase 3) 2026-08-17 06:38:31 +02:00
mobile fix: mobile client polish pass -- CI-caught XML bug, real logic/UX fixes 2026-08-17 16:41:15 +02:00
scripts feat: real PQC crypto + encrypted async ircd; rebrand to EtherHive 2026-08-16 21:14:05 +02:00
src fix: missing File import breaks the Linux memfd path compilation 2026-08-17 16:52:45 +02:00
tests fix: address Codex review findings on PR #6 2026-08-17 15:53:03 +02:00
.gitignore feat: etherhive-auth — wallet + ENS identity (ULTRAPLAN phase 1) 2026-08-16 21:14:24 +02:00
ARCHITECTURE.txt feat: real PQC crypto + encrypted async ircd; rebrand to EtherHive 2026-08-16 21:14:05 +02:00
Cargo.lock feat: wire wallet+ENS shared login into the real ircd (ULTRAPLAN phase 3) 2026-08-17 06:38:31 +02:00
Cargo.toml feat: wire wallet+ENS shared login into the real ircd (ULTRAPLAN phase 3) 2026-08-17 06:38:31 +02:00
HEADSCALE.md docs: align README/SECURITY/HEADSCALE with what's actually running 2026-08-17 10:13:50 +02:00
PROTOCOL.md feat: real PQC crypto + encrypted async ircd; rebrand to EtherHive 2026-08-16 21:14:05 +02:00
README.md docs: address Codex review findings — qualify /dm and honesty-auth claims 2026-08-17 10:15:41 +02:00
SECURITY.md docs: address Codex review findings — qualify /dm and honesty-auth claims 2026-08-17 10:15:41 +02:00
ULTRAPLAN.md feat: real PQC crypto + encrypted async ircd; rebrand to EtherHive 2026-08-16 21:14:05 +02:00

EtherHive

etherhive -- quantum-proof decentralized messaging

auth via honesty. transport via Mullvad double-hop. crypto via Kyber+X25519. memory via memfd+mlock. per-byte encryption via Quant1bitLLM seed. multihop SSH throwaway init. cosign-signed releases. zero disk trace.

The tagline above is the design target, not the current daemon. An external security review (#1) found a real gap between what these docs claim and what etherhive-ircd / etherhive-client actually run today. Short version:

  • Real and wired in: X25519 + ChaCha20Poly1305 transport encryption (directional keys, fixed in #2 after the review found a nonce-reuse bug); the /dm 1:1 E2E channel (X3DH + Double Ratchet + ML-KEM-1024 hybrid, src/ratchet.rs) -- though its prekey bundle bootstrap is unsigned/TOFU, so this holds against a passive server but not an actively malicious one, see below; wallet+ENS login (/login); real FIPS 203/204/205 PQC primitives as a library (src/pqc.rs).
  • NOT wired in, despite the tagline / diagram below: etherhive-vpn, etherhive-crypt, and etherhive-mesh are simulated stubs (they print success and do nothing); the memory fortress (src/memory.rs) is never called from the running binaries; per-byte LLM crypto (src/seed.rs) is unauthenticated XOR, not the HKDF+CSPRNG scheme SECURITY.md describes; SSH multihop init doesn't run automatically; honesty-auth (/honesty) isn't implemented in the TUI client at all, and its legacy-TCP form is a placeholder, not a signed/verified vector.
  • /msg is transport-only, not E2E — the server decrypts it to route and stores the plaintext body in in-memory chat history. Use /dm (TUI client) for an actually private 1:1 message; see the protocol table below.

See SECURITY.md for the same caveat applied line-by-line to the threat model, and issue #1 for the full audit.

                                                                +=============+
                                                                | ETHERHIVE   |
                                                                | DM  GROUP   |
                                                                | /msg /room  |
                                                                | /music /quant|
                                                                +=============+
                                                                       |
  +----------+    +----------+    +------------+    +------------+     |
  | SSH init |    | MEMFORT  |    | MULLVAD    |    | KYBER+X25  |     |
  | 3-hop    | -> | memfd    | -> | entry:CH   | -> | ML-KEM-1024| ----+
  | throwaway|    | mlock    |    | exit: IS   |    | per-byte   |
  | shred    |    | F_SEAL   |    | double-hop |    | LLM subkey |
  +----------+    +----------+    +------------+    +------------+
                         |               |               |
                    SEALED MEMORY   DOUBLE-HOP VPN   QUANTUM CRYPTO
                    (never disk)    (hide origin)    (post-quantum)

               +----------------------------------------------------+
               |                 HONESTY-AUTH                       |
               |  [game] [color] [poet] [poem] [band] [song]       |
               |  [birth] [mother] [constellation] [belief]         |
               |  [names] [country] [pets] [last_sex]               |
               |                                                     |
               |  core hash = SHA256(game+color+poet+poem+band)     |
               |  verify if stable match + >80% overall              |
               |  "you cannot steal someone's mother relationship"   |
               +----------------------------------------------------+

architecture

Four sidecar binaries, chained via CLI | Unix sockets:

etherhive up
  -> etherhive-vpn    (Mullvad double-hop WireGuard)
  -> etherhive-crypt  (Kyber-1024 + X25519 + per-byte LLM sub-keys)
  -> etherhive-mesh   (Tailscale/Headscale peer-to-peer)
  -> etherhive-ircd   (IRC protocol + honesty-auth + music.vaked.dev)

See ARCHITECTURE.txt for full ASCII blueprint.

quick start

# create your identity (17 honesty questions)
etherhive init

# start all sidecars
etherhive up

# DM someone
/msg alice hello, quantum-proof world

# join public room
/room #general

# share music from music.vaked.dev
/music

protocol

/msg <user> <text>       DM a peer (transport-encrypted only -- the
                          server decrypts to route and stores the body;
                          NOT end-to-end. Use /dm for real E2E.)
/dm <user> <text>         real E2E DM (TUI client only; X3DH + Double
                          Ratchet + ML-KEM-1024 -- server can't decrypt
                          the message content itself, but the prekey
                          bundle that bootstraps the session is
                          unsigned and trust-on-first-use, so an
                          actively malicious server can still MITM
                          session setup; see SECURITY.md)
/room <name>              join public room (searchable by all)
/leave                    leave current room
/me <action>              emote
/nick <name>              change display name
/honesty                  legacy TCP only, and only a placeholder
                          ("not yet configured") -- not implemented in
                          the TUI client, not signed, not verified
/verify <user>            not implemented anywhere
/music                    share current music.vaked.dev track
/quant <seed>             generate shared ternary matrix
/search <term>            search public group history

security

layer what status
TRANSPORT X25519 + ChaCha20Poly1305, directional keys live -- every WS connection
E2E X3DH + Double Ratchet + ML-KEM-1024 hybrid live -- /dm only, not /msg, but the prekey bundle it bootstraps from is unsigned/TOFU (see below)
AUTH wallet + ENS ownership (/login) live
SSH 3-hop throwaway init, keys shredded design only, not run automatically
MEM memfd+mlock+F_SEAL_WRITE+mprotect:R design only, unused by the running daemon
VPN Mullvad double-hop (entry->exit) etherhive-vpn is a simulated stub
CRYPT Kyber-1024 + X25519 hybrid sidecar etherhive-crypt is a simulated stub (the real hybrid crypto is in /dm, not this sidecar)
BYTE Quant1bitLLM per-byte sub-keys implemented as unauthenticated XOR, not the HKDF+CSPRNG scheme described in SECURITY.md; not used on the live path
MESH Tailscale/Headscale WireGuard etherhive-mesh is a simulated stub
AUTH honesty vector (17 fields) design only -- not implemented in the TUI client; the legacy-TCP /honesty handler returns a placeholder, not a signed/verified vector

Full threat model, with the same live-vs-design distinction: SECURITY.md

honesty-auth

No passwords. No OAuth. No email. Your identity is a vector of 17 deeply personal answers that only YOU can answer consistently over time.

The first 5 fields (game, color, poet, poem, band) form your core hash -- the cryptographic root of your identity. Stable fields (birth, names, constellation) must match exactly. Volatile fields (song, mood, belief, pets) can change.

A government can steal your password. It cannot steal your mother relationship. An impostor can fake your email. They cannot consistently fake your emotional response to Unforgiven II over months.

The identity is the PATTERN, not the SECRET. Like the ternary seed -- deterministic, reproducible, unstealable.

reserved names

[The Architect of Structural Honesty] -- Peter (founder)
(all others: first-claim-wins in the mesh)

genesis

vaked-base genesis seal hash:
7c242080f5f821e5eaf563fe2208d60632c451687baf65f4fe8e4a0d226e3ecf

docs

file what
PROTOCOL.md sidecar chain, auth flow, IRC wire format
SECURITY.md threat model, mem fortress, per-byte LLM crypto
HEADSCALE.md OSS Tailscale setup, NixOS + Docker, roadmap v0.1->v1.42
ARCHITECTURE.txt full ASCII blueprint diagram

CI

Blacksmith 4vcpu build+test on push. Cosign-signed binaries on tag.


signed on 2026-07-28, full moon, 10,000X by [The Architect of Structural Honesty]

WE. {-1, 0, +1}.