- Python 100%
| Filename | Latest commit message | Latest commit date |
|---|---|---|
The ledger refuses illegal order rather than recording it politely: a bind before a pop fails, nothing follows a refusal, and a subject cannot collapse around an unwarranted claim. The fold drives that ledger with nine material steps, and the seam between the two is the interesting part, so it is stated instead of implied: nine steps produce five recorded steps and six events, and the four silent steps are the two laminae and the two presses, where the material is constrained but nothing is adjudicated. Two limits are measured rather than mentioned: a fully consistent rewrite is invisible from inside a content-addressed ledger, and attenuation forbids escalation but not skipping. Both have fixtures. |
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| tests | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| pop.py | ||
| README.md | ||
| toss.py | ||
spherepop-toss — the POP record kernel and the TOSS fold
Two ideas that name the same discipline from opposite ends.
SpherePOP is the record: five event kinds, content-hash bound identifiers,
an append-only ledger, and rules that refuse illegal order.
TOSS is the material: nine monozukuri steps that take a closed sphere and
leave one flat laminated panel at the centre [0,0].
They meet in one sentence — commitment is attenuation — and this repo is the place where the sentence is executed instead of admired.
python3 pop.py --demo # four events, one collapsed subject, chain verified
python3 toss.py --run # fold a sphere: nine steps, six events, one proof
python3 toss.py --run --json # the same proof, machine-readable
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v # 27 tests
Standard library only. Python 3.11+.
The POP kernel
| kind | what it does | refused when |
|---|---|---|
pop |
opens a subject | the subject was already opened |
bind |
attaches a claim | no pop, or the subject was refused |
verify |
warrants a specific bind | nothing bound, unknown bind, or already warranted |
collapse |
closes the subject | any bind is unwarranted, or nothing was warranted |
refuse |
stops the subject | no pop, or only verified binds (a refusal must not erase a warrant) |
Identifiers are src|sha256(canonical body), where the canonical body is sorted-key,
separator-free JSON. Same event, same id, on any machine. verify_chain()
re-derives every id and every link; root() folds the whole history into one hash
— and that hash is the only thing worth publishing, for the reason in the second
limitation below.
The TOSS fold
1 製材 spherePop reshape_rw POP one unbroken ribbon
2 接着① crossWeave7x2 layer_rw — seven veneers at ninety degrees
3 成型① dieMold1 press_rw — first thermal press
4 インサート insert4 drill_rw BIND four Onime nuts
5 接着② crossWeaveTop2 seal_rw — laminate over the hardware
6 成型② dieMold2 seal_rw — hidden hardware seal, zero screws
7 トリム ncTrim trim_rw REFUSE the offcut is opened and refused
8 研磨 koguchiPolish polish_ro VERIFY chamfer so surfaces meet square
9 仕上げ foldToCenter place_ro COLLAPSE fold into [0,0]
Nine material steps produce only five recorded steps and six events. The four silent steps — the two laminae and the two presses — are exactly the ones where the material is under constraint while nothing is adjudicated. Nobody has to decide anything while a press is closed. That seam between the material and the record is a choice, marked as one here rather than smuggled in as a derivation.
freedom 8 → 1 is non-increasing at every step, and strictly decreasing at all of
them except 5 → 6, where the second press closes the same seam and so removes
nothing new. The test asserts the flat step is exactly [6], so a future edit that
flattens something else fails loudly.
Two limitations, measured rather than mentioned
1. A consistent rewrite is invisible from inside. If someone edits a payload,
recomputes its id, and relinks the following event, verify_chain() returns
True — because the history is now internally consistent. No content-addressed
ledger can catch that alone. The defence is publishing root() somewhere the
rewriter does not control. test_a_consistent_rewrite_is_invisible_without_an_anchor
asserts both halves: the chain passes, and the root changes.
2. Attenuation forbids escalation, not skipping. In Vaked,
examples/spherepop/spherepop-lifecycle.vaked
checks clean, and so does
spherepop-shortcut.vaked,
which draws a claim closing without ever being warranted. A closed subject holds
less than a bound one, so the bad shape is a narrowing edge and the checker has
nothing to say. Order is a rule, not a lattice. That is why pop.py enforces
E-COLLAPSE-UNWARRANTED and the mesh only enforces the shape.
The one thing the graph can catch is the sharpest rule of all:
spherepop-refusal-leak.vaked
hands a refused subject back to a claiming surface and produces exactly one
E-CAP-ATTENUATION — because closed cannot become claimable without
escalation.
Verified on this machine
| claim | evidence |
|---|---|
| kernel + fold test suite | 27 tests, OK |
spherepop-lifecycle.vaked |
{"diagnostics": []} |
spherepop-shortcut.vaked |
{"diagnostics": []} (the limitation, confirmed) |
spherepop-refusal-leak.vaked |
exactly 1 E-CAP-ATTENUATION |
| same sphere, twice | identical root() |
| different sphere | different root() |
| the fold's state | collapsed, chain intact |
Files
pop.py the record kernel (Ledger, Event, five kinds, chain)
toss.py the fold: nine steps, freedom ladder, proof emitter
tests/test_pop_toss.py 27 tests, including the two limitations
replayable ⇒ admissible · a plausible branch may be ranked; only a verified
branch may be bound · {<3,<3,<3}+1